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Abstract
This paper provides evidence of the effect of age at school entry on college admission
and earnings. It does so by exploiting a number of features in the application process
to one of the major flagship universities in Brazil. By comparing applicants with
different ages at school entry depending on whether they were born on December 31
or on January 1, our estimates show that applicants who delayed first-grade enrollment
present higher aptitude test scores and probability of admission. Our results further
suggest that advantaged applicants also earn more early in their careers.
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1 Introduction
The perception that maturity plays an important role in school learning has encouraged
parents and teachers to delay children’s first-grade enrollment. As a consequence, there
has been a significant increase in the age at school entry in countries such as the USA
(Deming and Dynarski 2008). In fact, there is strong evidence that older pupils tend to
outperform their younger classmates in early grades (Bedard and Dhuey 2006; Puhani
andWeber 2007; McEwan and Shapiro 2008; Justin 2009). However, there is also evidence
that this difference declines over time and disappears in the long run, having no positive
effect on adult outcomes (Elder and Lubotsky 2009; Mühlenweg and Puhani 2010). Some
studies even find that entering school later reduces educational attainment, by increasing
high school dropout rates, and decreases lifetime earnings, by reducing experience in the
labor market (Angrist and Krueger 1991; 1992; Dobkin and Ferreira 2010; Black et al.
2011).1 Nonetheless, the positive effects in early grades may be persistent in a system
where students are tracked early into different schools or classes (Allen and Barnsley,
1993; Fredriksson and Öckert 2014).
Given the weak and still disputable evidence of its long-term effects, our study presents
and discusses the consequences of a delayed school entry on the admission of college
applicants and on their subsequent earnings. We exploit the admission process to one
of the major flagship universities in Brazil, which selects candidates strictly based on an
entrance exam. In addition to its high quality and reputation, Universidade Federal de
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Pernanbuco (UFPE) is a public university and does not charge tuition fees. As a result,
practically all high school graduates in the state of Pernambuco apply to this institution as
their first choice. This circumstance makes our study unique because candidates who are
not accepted by this university cannot easily enroll at another equally good institution.2
Moreover, Brazil does not have a tracking system that could explain the persistence of
early disadvantages. At the same time, the country also has one of the highest rates of
grade retention in the world (Bruns et al. 2012).3 Thus, this system might diminish the
disadvantage felt by younger pupils, who are more likely to repeat a grade.
We compare college applicants whose age differences at school entry are exogenously
determined by whether they were born on December 31 or on January 1, along with the
minimum-age rule enforced by primary schools in Brazil. Our analysis, however, should
not be interpreted as the long-term effect on the probability of first graders going to col-
lege. Instead, we estimate the effect of delaying school entry on high school graduates
aiming to join an elite institution. Our regression-discontinuity (RD) design shows that,
among boys, delaying school entry by 1 year increases the admission test score by 0.5
standard deviations (sds) and the probability of college admission by 15 percentage points
(p.p.). Importantly, due to the higher repetition rates among early entrants, the age dif-
ference between students born on December 31 and those born on January 1 practically
disappears by the time they graduate from high school. Therefore, the effect on college
admission cannot be attributed to differences in age at the test but rather to learning
disadvantages that persist over time. For girls, the effect at early ages is weaker and not
persistent on average.4
According to Elder and Lubotsky (2009), two potential mechanisms could explain
why later entrants outperform their peers. One is that greater maturity at school entry
improves children’s learning ability at primary school and this effect persists over time.
The other is that starting school later implies more human capital accumulated from
parenting. To the extent that well-educated parents provide more human capital accu-
mulation at home, the relationship between school-entry age and future outcomes should
be weaker for the children of less-educated parents. We find, however, that the effect
of delaying school entry on test scores is stronger among candidates with less parental
education. If parents do not have a college degree, the enrollment delay increases the
admission test score of boys by 0.73–0.86 sds and of girls by 0.14–0.57 sds. These findings
imply that the difference in college admission scores comes from candidates’ learning abil-
ity at primary school, rather than from previously accumulated knowledge. Our findings
are consistent with the ideas that learning disadvantages at an early age have a persistent
impact on adults (Cunha and Heckman 2007; Cunha et al. 2010) and that grade retention
is not an effective way to remedy this distortion (Manacorda 2012).
We also conduct a number of tests to shore up our conclusions. First, we confirm the
strength of our instrument by showing that children born on January 1 and on December
31 are indeed more likely to be the oldest and the youngest in the first grade, respectively.
Second, our results do not seem to be driven by birthday manipulation. If parents planned
ahead so that their children were born after New Year’s Eve, then the density of birthdays
would be discontinuous around this day. Using the density test proposed by McCrary
(2008), however, we show that there is no significant discontinuity between December 31
and January 1. Similarly, parents of children born on New Year’s Day have essentially the
same income and education levels as parents of children born on New Year’s Eve. Thus,
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our results are unlikely to be driven by parental background or birthday manipulation;
they certainly derive only from the minimum-age rule.
Finally, we verify whether the difference found in college admission rates is carried into
the labor market. Unfortunately, we have only data of candidates’ employment in their
20s, which are not enough to estimate lifetime earnings. Nevertheless, among poorer can-
didates, we find that men born on January 1 earn about 20 % more at the age of 25 than if
they were born on December 31. For female candidates, the difference in earnings is not
significant, but being born a day later increases by 4–14 % the probability of graduating
from college andworking by the age of 25. These results are consistent with the hypothesis
that delaying school entry increases the lifetime earnings of poorer candidates.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the four sources
of data used to estimate the effects on college admission, first-grade enrollment, and adult
earnings. Section 3 discusses our empirical strategy based on an RD design. Section 4
presents our main findings, as well as several tests that confirm the consistency of these
findings. Our conclusions are presented in Section 5.
2 Data
2.1 College application data
The main source of data used in this study is the admission exam taken by candidates
for the Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE), which is a flagship university in the
Northeast of Brazil.5 The vast majority of its undergraduate students used to be admitted
through an exam, called the vestibular, which was held only once a year.6 This exam has
two rounds and evaluates students in the following subjects: mathematics, Portuguese,
a foreign language (English, French, or Spanish), literature, history, geography, physics,
chemistry, and biology. In the first round, every candidate takes one test per subject and
the score is the average of all these tests. The results of this eliminate about 40 % of the
candidates, who do not go to the next round. The second-round exam comprises Por-
tuguese, a foreign language, and the three other subjects specifically required for the
future program.7 The final score is a weighted average of the first- and second-round
scores. Finally, each program admits those candidates with the best final scores until all
the places are taken. Up to 2013, the final test score was the only admission criterion, so
a candidate could not leapfrog others with better scores.8 On average, about 10 % of the
original candidates per program were admitted.
The dataset consists of the application details of 216,771 candidates between 2002
and 2005. However, most of the candidates take the exam more than once. Apart from
not being admitted in previous years, some of them retake the exam because they want
to switch majors or even institutions. To analyze high school graduates, our sample is
restricted to those who graduated from high school in the year that they took the exam.
Although failed candidates can retake the exam, we are interested in the cases in which
they are immediately admitted to an elite school. Either delaying college admission or
going to another institution is considered costly for candidates because it implies less life-
time earnings. In addition, we exclude all candidates who finished high school on adult
education programs and those with a large age-grade distortion.
Because we are interested in the effect of delaying primary school entrance at 6 years of
age, we keep only candidates who are 18.5 years or younger—i.e., those who spent at most
12 years at school. These candidates either delayed their school entry for at most 1 year
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or repeated at most one grade. Due to this age restriction, we can still separate the reason
for delaying high school graduation by using the date of birth as an instrumental variable.
For older candidates, their age can be explained by more combinations of entry delay and
grade repetition so that the instrument becomes exponentially weaker. The final sample
has 45,261 observations, evenly split between 2002 and 2005 and between the various
birth cohorts. A birth cohort is defined as a group of candidates born between July 1 and
June 30th of the following year.
It is worth stressing that almost half the candidates do not take the second-round exam.
Moreover, since some majors are more competitive than others, the second-round exam
is different not only in terms of subjects but also in terms of difficulty. Accordingly, we
use only the first-round scores to compare the performance of candidates. This score is
also standardized every year based on the mean and standard deviation of all candidates.
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics. In our sample, the percentage of admitted
candidates is 9.7 %, which is slightly lower than the overall percentage of 10.3 %. How-
ever, the average test score of first-time candidates is 0.22 sds greater than the overall
mean score. These differences may be explained by the fact that first-time candidates usu-
ally apply for more competitive programs, so their probability of admission is lower even
though their average score is higher.
2.2 Primary and high school data
To support our evidence and identification strategy, we also use data from PNAD,
Brazil’s National Household Survey, from 1992 to 2005, and from the 2001 National Basic
Education Assessment System (SAEB).
The purpose of the PNAD data is to answer the following questions: (1) Are children
born more frequently before or after January 1? (2) Do children born on January 1 have
to delay their entrance to primary school? (3) Does the age gap in the first grade remain
until they graduate from high school? All these questions are addressed before we move
to our main results.
Nonetheless, the PNAD sample cannot be automatically compared to the college appli-
cation sample, mainly because only 23 % of children in Brazil graduate from high school
by the age of 18. If we consider the children of parents who have at least high school edu-
cation, then this rate jumps to almost 70 %. Accordingly, in addition to restricting the
PNAD sample to children in the Northeast region who were born between July 1984 and
June 1989, we also reweight it so that it mimics the same parental education as the sam-











where woldi is the original sample weight from PNAD and pei is the parental education
value of child i. While the probability on the numerator is estimated using the college
application data, the denominator is estimated using PNAD. The new sample weight,
wnewi , is also rescaled so that it has the same mean and standard deviation as woldi , not
generating artificial outliers.
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics
All samples Born in July–Dec. Born in Jan.–June
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Admitted 0.097 0.296 0.095 0.294 0.099 0.298
First-round score 0.223 0.880 0.186 0.890 0.256 0.878
Age 17.78 0.431 17.91 0.465 17.64 0.341
Born in January–June 0.489 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Female 0.591 0.492 0.583 0.493 0.599 0.490
Father’s education
Middle school 0.163 0.369 0.163 0.370 0.162 0.369
High school 0.382 0.486 0.378 0.485 0.385 0.487
College 0.351 0.477 0.349 0.477 0.354 0.478
Mother’s education
Middle school 0.140 0.347 0.145 0.352 0.136 0.342
High school 0.393 0.488 0.388 0.487 0.398 0.489
College 0.383 0.486 0.376 0.484 0.389 0.488
Household income
5–10 MWs 0.294 0.456 0.294 0.456 0.294 0.456
11–15 MWs 0.119 0.323 0.116 0.320 0.121 0.326
16–20 MWs 0.081 0.273 0.081 0.273 0.081 0.273
>20 MWs 0.103 0.304 0.105 0.307 0.101 0.301
Private high school 0.709 0.454 0.700 0.458 0.719 0.450
Private primary/middle school 0.717 0.451 0.704 0.457 0.731 0.444
Living in Pernambuco 0.959 0.197 0.960 0.195 0.958 0.200
Living in the Northeast 0.985 0.122 0.985 0.122 0.985 0.122
Birth cohort
1985–1986 0.326 0.469 0.326 0.469 0.327 0.469
1986–1987 0.345 0.475 0.348 0.476 0.342 0.474
Year
2003 0.327 0.469 0.271 0.444 0.258 0.438
2004 0.332 0.471 0.279 0.449 0.258 0.437
2005 0.247 0.431 0.173 0.379 0.227 0.419
Employed at 25 years old 0.488 0.500 0.494 0.500 0.482 0.500
Employed and graduated at 25 0.186 0.389 0.184 0.387 0.187 0.390
Annual earnings (R$) if employed 19,784 22,026 19,903 22,710 19,655 21,267
Number of observations 45,261 23,133 22,128
The sample of candidates for undergraduate programs at UFPE is restricted to those who graduated from high school in the year
that they took the college entrance exam and were under 18.5 years old. The first-round score is standardized, with mean zero
and variance one, with respect to the whole set of candidates taking the exam at the same time. Annual earnings are deflated to
December 2006 level using the National Consumer Price Index (INPC)
MW current minimum wage
The purpose of the SAEB data is to verify the positive selection in our sample of college
applicants. Its survey asks whether students want to continue or stop studying after grad-
uation. This allows us to look not only at performance but also at high school students’
decision to pursue higher education as a function of their month of birth.
2.3 Employment data
To estimate the effect of birthday on candidates’ employment and earnings, we match
their application to UFPE with employment records from Relação Anual de Informação
Sociais (RAIS) from the Brazilian Ministry of Labor and Employment, MTE. RAIS
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presents comprehensive individual information on occupations, demographic charac-
teristics, and earnings of all registered employees in Brazil. By law, every private or
public-sector employer must report this information every year.
When available, the matching is based on the candidate’s social security number. Other-
wise, it is based on the candidate’s name, gender, and date and place of birth. Using RAIS
data from 2009 to 2012, when the candidates were 25 years old, we are able to find 49 %
of them. That is, at least 49 % of the UFPE first-time candidates in 2002–2005 were for-
mally employed at the age of 25. However, only 19 % (39 % of the employed) had already
graduated from college (see Table 1). On average, those who are employed receive almost
R$20,000 a year, which corresponds to 4.7 minimum wages in 2006. Earnings are deflated
to the December 2006 level using the National Consumer Price Index (INPC).
3 Empirical strategy
In this section, we explain the empirical strategy we adopt to identify the causal effect
of early maturity on test scores after high school, college admission, and adult earn-
ings. In our context, early maturity means delaying the start of primary school and then
being one of the oldest pupils in the first grade. Since parents do not randomly take such
a decision and we cannot observe when the college candidates started primary school,
we use the candidates’ birthday as an instrumental variable. In particular, we compare
candidates born on December 31 with those born a day later, on January 1, using a
regression-discontinuity (RD) design.
In Brazil, the law required children to enroll in first grade in the year they turn seven.9
Moreover, most schools did not admit children to the first grade unless they were turning
seven that year. Thus, children born on December 31 could start primary school when
they are still 6 years old. However, other children born a day later could not start the first
grade in the same year because they are still a day away from turning six on December 31.
Let Yi be student i’s achievement after high school—e.g., as shown in their aptitude test
score, college admission, employment, and earnings. Although the minimum-age rule is
supposed to affect our outcome of interest through several channels, such as maturity
when applying for college and learning ability during primary school, these channels do
not offset each other. Thus, consider the following reduced-form model:
Yi = τ I (Bi ≥ 0) + g (Bi) + εi, (1)
where Bi is student i’s birthday, which is equal to zero on January 1 and negative (positive)
before (after) this date, g is a nonparametric function, and εi is a random term. While
function g captures the systematic relationship between the birth date and the outcome
of interest, coefficient τ represents the discontinuity in this relationship around January
1. That is, τ is the effect of being born on January 1 rather than December 31.
To interpret τ as the effect of the minimum-age policy, first we need the age constraint
to be binding—i.e., some parents want their children to start school but they cannot do
so due to their age. This condition is verified by estimating the school enrollment rate, Ei,
around age six, as follows:
Ei = τEI (Bi ≥ 0) + gE (Bi) + εE,i. (2)
If τE = 0, then the age constraint makes children born on January 1 delay their school
start for a year.
Matta et al. IZA Journal of Labor Economics  (2016) 5:9 Page 7 of 25
The fundamental assumption in identifying τ and τE is that parents do not manipu-
late their child’s birthday. Parents may choose whether their child is born before or after
January 1 and this choice could be related to parenting skills. In a RD design, the manip-
ulation of the running variable is an issue only if it happens locally around the cutoff.
If parents prefer January 1 to December 31, or vice versa, we should observe a signifi-
cant difference in birthday densities between these two dates. Accordingly, we verify the
assumption of no manipulation using McCrary’s (2008) test.
As we estimate Eqs. (1) and (2), the effect of delaying school entry on future outcomes,




All equations are estimated using triangular kernel functions. The optimal band-
width is chosen according to the procedures of Calonico et al. (2014) and Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012). Robust standard errors are calculated as described by Calonico
et al. (2014).
4 Results
Our results are divided into five parts. First, we show that our instrument (i.e., being born
on or after January 1) is indeed exogenous and not subject to parents’ choice. Second, we
confirm that the minimum-age rule for primary school has been enforced in Brazil and
that this instrument is strong enough to predict school-entry age. In Sections 4.3 and 4.4,
we present our main results and discuss potential mechanisms through which school-
entry age is related to college admission. Finally, we show some evidence for the effect on
employment and earnings by the time candidates turn 25.
4.1 Is the date of birth endogenous?
Before we move to the main results, we should check whether parents choose that their
child’s birthday occurs before or after January 1. If they perceived the child would perform
better among younger peers, they might plan her birthday to be after New Year’s Eve. In
this case, other characteristics related to parenting skills could also drive our results.
To verify this issue, we perform two different tests. First, we test for birthday manipula-
tion using McCrary’s test. McCrary (2008) proposes an estimator for the discontinuity in
the density function around the cutoff (January 1) of the running variable (the birthday).
His test is implemented as a Wald test in which the density is continuous under the null
hypothesis. Second, we verify whether being born before or after January 1 is related to
parental education. Here we assume that the parent’s education is a good proxy for par-
enting. The more educated parents are, the higher the investment made in their child’s
education.
The first graph on the left of Fig. 1 shows that first-time college candidates are more
likely to be born on January 1 than on December 31. However, this difference can be the
result not only of parental choice but also of performance at school. If students born on
December 31 perform worse in school, then they are also less likely to finish high school
and apply for college. The second graph on the right confirms that there is no significant
difference in the population over the probability of being born before or after January 1.
Namely, if we look at the whole cohort of children born at much the same time, living
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Fig. 1 Distribution of birthdays and the McCrary density test. This figure shows the histograms of birthdays
with the bin width equal to 10 days. The center of the graphs is zero, which represents January 1. The first
graph on the left is the distribution of birthdays of UFPE first-time candidates between 2002 and 2005. The
second graph on the right (PNAD data) is the distribution of birthdays of children born between July 1984
and June 1988, living in the state of Pernambuco, and with similar parental education to that of the UFPE
candidates. θ is McCrary’s (2008) estimator for log density discontinuity, with standard errors in parentheses.
*** represent statistical significance at the 1 % level
in the same state, and with similar parental education, there is no evidence of birthday
manipulation.
As a result, the discontinuity found among college candidates can be ascribed to school
performance, which can potentially lower our causal estimate. That is, if the missing chil-
dren applied for college at the right age, they would perform worse than those who do
actually apply, lowering the average score below the cutoff.
To provide evidence of this positive selection in our sample, we present in Fig. 2 two
conditional density estimates of the SAEB score for high school graduates in the state of
Pernambuco. One considers the sample of students who are 18.5 years or younger (dashed














5.2 5.4 5.6 5.8 6 6.2
log(score)
small age−grade distortion large age−grade distortion
Fig. 2 School graduates, willingness to study, and positive selection. This figure shows two density estimates
of the SAEB score for high school graduates in the state of Pernambuco. One is from a sample of students
who are 18.5 years or younger (dashed line) and the other is from those older than 18.5 years (solid). This
figure also displays the conditional percentage of students that answered “yes” when asked about their
willingness to continue studying after high school
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line). Note that there is a mass of students with a large age-grade distortion on low scores
when compared to those with a small age distortion. That is, the former group performs
significantly worse than the sample that we use to obtain our estimates.
Figure 2 also reports the percentage of students who answered yes when asked about
their willingness to continue studying after graduation. Of the students with a large age-
grade distortion, 62 % answered that they wanted to continue studying, whereas 77 % of
students with a small distortion gave this answer. These numbers suggest that our sample
comes from a highly selected group of high school graduates.
Next, we explore the direction of the bias for high school graduates born around the dis-
continuity (in January and December) using the SAEB data. We first show in Table 2 that
students born in December aremore likely to have a large age-grade distortion when com-
pared to those born in January. We then analyze if the (positive) selection bias is stronger
for those born in December. This would imply an even lower average score below the cut-
off if those excluded from the sample had applied for college at the right age. We observe
that the difference in the average test score slightly decreases after we restrict the sample
to those who are willing to apply for college. Further restricting the SAEB data to those
with a small age-grade distortion, so that it resembles our sample, the average test score
becomes slightly higher for those born in December than for those born in January. This
evidence reinforces our argument that our sample contains students positively selected
from those who would eventually apply for college.10
Although the probabilities of being born before or after January 1 are similar for
the overall cohort, well-educated parents could choose a different birthday than less-
educated parents (Buckles and Hungerman 2013). Figure 3 presents the RD estimates for
parent’s education. The result confirms that parents of candidates born before and after
January 1 have a similar probability of holding a college degree.11 Similarly, Fig. 4 shows
that there is no significant difference in terms of household income. Candidates’ house-
holds have nearly the same probability of being poor or rich—i.e., receiving either less
than five minimum wages or more than ten minimum wages—regardless of their birth
date.
4.2 Does their birth date make children delay school entry?
In this section, we present and discuss our “first-stage” estimates. In other words, we
verify if children born on January 1 are indeed more likely to be the oldest student in class
Table 2 Descriptive statistics: selected sample
Born in Born in Difference
December January
Large age-grade distortion 0.235 0.186 −0.049
(0.426) (0.391) (.052)
Log (score) 5.586 5.594 0.008
(0.196) (0.213) (0.026)
Log (score) for students willing to keep studying 5.601 5.603 0.001
(0.204) (0.214) (0.032)
Log (score) for students willing to study 5.634 5.616 −0.019
with small age-grade distortion (0.206) (0.221) (0.037)
Summary statistics for high school graduates born in January and December come from SAEB in 2001. The large age-grade
distortion group comprises students older than 18.5 years. A student is “willing to keep studying” if she wants to continue
studying after high school
Matta et al. IZA Journal of Labor Economics  (2016) 5:9 Page 10 of 25
 = -0.024









Jan 1-100 -75 -50 -25 25 50 75 100
Birthday
Father has College Degree
 = 0.003








Jan 1-100 -75 -50 -25 25 50 75 100
Birthday
Mother has College Degree
Fig. 3 Relationship between birthday and parents’ education. This figure shows the relationship between
candidates’ birthday and their parents having a college degree. The center of the graphs is zero, which
represents January 1. The first graph on the left shows the probability of the father having a college degree.
The second graph on the right shows the probability of the mother having a college degree. Functions are
estimated using a triangular kernel with the bandwidth selection procedure proposed by Calonico et al.
(2014). τ is the RD estimate, with robust standard errors in parentheses
during their primary school years, while those born on December 31 are more likely to be
the youngest. Using data from PNAD, we investigate what happened to those cohorts of
college candidates when they were 6 years old.
Close to 6 years of age, children born on January 1 are in fact less likely to be enrolled
in the first grade than those born just a day earlier. Figure 5 shows that the difference for
boys is almost 27 p.p., while for girls it is 17 p.p. These estimates indicate that being even
one day short of turning six can make both boys and girls delay their school start in the
 = -0.009
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Fig. 4 Relationship between birthday and household income. This figure shows the relationship between
candidates’ birthday and their household income by the time of the exam. The center of the graphs is zero,
which represents January 1. The first graph on the left shows the probability of the household receiving less
than five minimum wages per month. The second graph on the right shows the probability of the household
receiving more than ten minimum wages per month. Functions are estimated using a triangular kernel with
the bandwidth selection procedure proposed by Calonico et al. (2014). τ is the RD estimate, with robust
standard errors in parentheses
Matta et al. IZA Journal of Labor Economics  (2016) 5:9 Page 11 of 25
 = -0.268***






















Jan 1-100 -75 -50 -25 25 50 75 100
Birthday
Female
Fig. 5 First-grade enrollment around 6 years old. This figure shows the relationship between birthday and
being enrolled in the first grade at around 6 years of age. The center of the graphs is zero, which represents
January 1. The first graph shows the relationship for boys and the second for girls. Data come from PNAD for
cohorts born between July 1985 and June 1991, living in the Northeast region. The sample is weighted to
resemble the parental education of college candidates. Functions are estimated using a triangular kernel
with the bandwidth selection procedure proposed by Calonico et al. (2014). τ is the RD estimate, with robust
standard errors in parentheses. *** represents statistical significance at the 1 % level
Northeast region of Brazil. This rule causes the children born on December 31more likely
to be younger than their classmates than those born on January 1, who start a year later.
If older students perform better than their peers, as presumed, we should expect that
the repetition rate for children born on December 31 will be higher than for the ones born
on January 1. In this case, the age gap created by the minimum-age rule should narrow
over time as the former repeat a grade and turn into one of the oldest in their class.12
Similarly, the grade gap—i.e., being at least a year behind where the rest of the cohort
should be—must narrow at the same rate. Table 3 presents the RD estimates for the grade
gap. For boys, it practically disappears at age nine, when they were supposed to be in the
fourth grade. For girls, it vanishes in the second grade.
Table 3 RD estimates of the grade gap by age
Male Female
Age τ z-stat τ z-stat
6 0.268*** 4.581 0.172*** 2.794
7 0.095* 1.867 −0.002 −0.349
8 0.135*** 4.098 0.029 0.998
9 0.031 0.69 0.042* 1.893
10 0.008 0.389 −0.011 −0.803
11 −0.005 −0.419 −0.010 −0.903
12 0.002 0.082 0.001 0.046
13 −0.004 −0.395 0.024** 1.974
14 0.014 1.264 0.023** 2.256
15 −0.014 −1.192 0.001 0.015
16 −0.013 −0.558 0.015 1.565
This table shows the difference between children born on January 1 and on December 31. The dependent variable is equal to one
if the student is in the wrong grade for his age and zero otherwise. The first columns show the difference for males, while the last
columns show the difference for females. Data come from PNAD for cohorts born between July 1985 and June 1991, living in the
Northeast region. The sample is weighted to resemble the parental education of the college candidates. Functions are estimated
using a triangular kernel with the bandwidth selection procedure proposed by Calonico et al. (2014). τ is the robust RD estimate
***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively
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When they graduate from high school and apply for college, the age gap is almost zero,
as seen in Fig. 6. Therefore, any difference between college candidates born before and
after January 1 cannot be attributed to differences in their current age. The difference
between these two groups lies in their learning ability in primary school, which results
in a greater repetition rate for one of them. Whereas students born on January 1 tend
to outperform their classmates in primary school, students born on December 31 tend
to fall behind the class. We discuss next how those two different experiences affect the
probability of their admission to college. Later, we examine whether this differentiation
emerges in school or at home.
4.3 Main results—the effect on college admission
Even though there is no age gap between college candidates of the same cohort when they
apply to college for the first time, they can still have different outcomes. Figure 7 confirms
this prediction, at least for males. The average score of all those born on December 31
is 0.13 sds less than the average of those born on January 1. This difference in the score
affects the probability of college admission in about 4 p.p.
To calculate the effect of delaying school entry on college admission and test scores,
we simply have to divide the estimates in Fig. 7 by those in Fig. 5—i.e., by applying the
Wald estimator. For boys, we find that delaying a year of school increases by 0.5 sds their
aptitude test score and by 15 p.p. their probability of college admission. These effects are
greater than the ones found by Bedard and Dhuey (2006) for eighth graders in OECD
countries and by Justin (2009) for tenth graders in Canada but similar to the ones found
by McEwan and Shapiro (2008) for eighth graders in Chile and by Crawford et al. (2010)
for high school graduates in England.
For girls, no significant difference is found, at least on average. McEwan and Shapiro
(2008) also find that delaying primary school enrollment affects more boys than girls in
 = 0.035
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Female
Fig. 6 Age of first-time college candidates. This figure shows the relationship between the birthday and the
age at which candidates apply for college for the first time. The center of the graphs is zero, which represents
January 1. The first graph shows the relationship for boys and the second for girls. Data come from applications
for undergraduate programs at UFPE from 2002 to 2005. The sample is restricted to those who graduated
from high school in the same year and were under 18.5 years old. Functions are estimated using a triangular
kernel with the bandwidth selection procedure proposed by Calonico et al. (2014). τ is the RD estimate, with
robust standard errors in parentheses
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 = 0.039*






















































Fig. 7 Probability of college admission and test scores. This figure shows the relationship between birthday
and college admission (on the left), as well as between the birthday and the college entrance test score (on
the right). The center of the graphs is zero, which represents January 1. The first graphs at the top show the
relationship for boys, and the ones at the bottom show that for girls. Data come from applications for
undergraduate programs at UFPE from 2002 to 2005. The sample is restricted to those who graduated from
high school in the same year and were under 18.5 years old. Functions are estimated using a triangular kernel
with the bandwidth selection procedure proposed by Calonico et al. (2014). τ is the RD estimate, with robust
standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively
the long run. A possible explanation is that boys mature later than girls, so their gap in
terms of learning ability tends to persist longer over the primary school period.
Table 4 presents similar RD estimates but using different local-polynomial degrees and
different bandwidth selection procedures. Our results look robust whatever procedure we
apply.
4.4 The effect by parental education and school choice
Elder and Lubotsky (2009) point out two potential mechanisms that make older students
better than their classmates. On the one hand, maturity may affect children’s learning
ability in primary school and this effect continues over time. On the other hand, starting
school a year later means more time spent at home, so more human capital accumulation
from parenting. If we assume that well-educated parents provide more human capital










Table 4 RD estimates of college admission and test scores
Admission Test score
Polyn. CCT procedure IW procedure CCT procedure IW procedure
degree τ z-stat Bandwidth τ z-stat Bandwidth τ z-stat Bandwidth τ z-stat Bandwidth
Male
0 0.026* 1.741 23.26 0.005* 1.918 110.00 0.087** 2.554 31.72 0.066** 2.341 43.20
1 0.039* 1.749 46.85 0.032* 1.905 65.48 0.132*** 2.696 53.71 0.091** 2.275 83.79
2 0.042* 1.660 86.43 0.037* 1.848 117.89 0.185*** 2.751 59.66 0.096** 2.525 160.87
Female
0 −0.008 −0.954 26.06 −0.001 −0.493 75.72 0.022 0.735 51.65 0.026 0.868 64.13
1 −0.011 −0.960 69.12 −0.003 −1.309 129.29 0.012 0.165 76.14 0.013* 1.647 164.55
2 −0.017 −0.962 72.30 −0.010 0.176 111.32 −0.065 −1.117 54.92 0.004 0.878 109.72
This table shows the RD estimates of college admission and test scores using different local-polynomial degrees (per row) and different bandwidth selection procedures (per column). The CCT procedure is proposed by Calonico et al.
(2014). The IW procedure is proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). All functions are estimated using a triangular kernel. Data come from applications for undergraduate programs at UFPE from 2002 to 2005. The sample is
restricted to those who graduated from high school in the same year and were under 18.5 years old. τ is the robust RD estimate
***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively
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age and future outcomes should be stronger for the former’s children. Namely, the effect
on aptitude test scores would be proportional to parental education. Nevertheless, we
find the opposite. The gap between candidates born in late December and early January
is higher among those with less parental education.
Table 5 shows that the birthday effect on the test scores of boys is between 0.16 and 0.21
sds if their parents do not have a college degree and between 0.04 and 0.19 sds if at least
one of them does. If we divide these estimates by the effect on first-grade enrollment, we
find that delaying the school start increases by 0.73–0.86 sds the average test scores in the
former group. Even for girls, the effect becomes significant if we look only at the group
with less parental education. In this group, being born on January 1 increases by 0.08–
0.11 sds the average test score. As a consequence, delaying school entry increases their
average test score by 0.14–0.57 sds. For both boys and girls with well-educated parents,
the difference is insignificant and very close to zero.13
There are several reasons why the effect varies with parental education. To begin with,
education is closely related to wealth and wealthier parents can afford additional sup-
port for their children (e.g., by hiring private tutors), and this may compensate for any
disadvantage.14 Table 6 confirms that similar results are found if we split the sample by
household income. That is, the effect on both boys and girls is stronger and significant if
they come from poor households, but it is very close to zero if they come from households
that receive more than five minimum wages per month.15
Moreover, wealthier parents can send their children to better schools, which may give
special attention to the youngest pupils. Table 7 confirms that the birthday effect is signif-
icant for candidates from public high schools but insignificant for candidates from private
institutions. If parents assumed that private schools are better for disadvantaged students,
candidates’ birthday might be correlated with private school enrollment. We observe in
the first graph of Fig. 8 that there is no significant relationship between birthday and atten-
dance at a private institution at early ages. However, candidates born on or after January
1 are more likely to come from private high schools (second graph at the top).
The difference between the two graphs at the top of Fig. 8 suggests that children are not
initially sorted into primary schools on the basis of their birthday. But after then, advan-
taged students who were born in January are more likely to be in private high schools.
The graphs in the bottom row reveal that this difference is not due to the movement
of disadvantaged students from private to public schools but rather to the movement of
advantaged students from public to private institutions. That is, parents of older (and
better) students in public schools are more willing to pay the cost of a private high school.
This result has two potential implications. First, the movement of better students from
public primary/middle schools to private high schools may lower the average above
the cutoff point in both public and private high schools. As a result, the effects pre-
sented in Table 7 would be underestimated—i.e., they represent lower bounds. Second,
this movement also represents a self-tracking mechanism that keeps disadvantaged stu-
dents in public schools and moves advantaged students to private schools. Although
Brazil does not have a formal tracking system, sorting of this kind may explain why early
disadvantages have persistent effects.
According to Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) and Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2015),
however, private schools do not necessarily improve students’ test scores in developing










Table 5 RD estimates of test scores by parental education
Less-educated parents Well-educated parents
Polyn. CCT procedure IW procedure CCT procedure IW procedure
degree τ z-stat Bandwidth τ z-stat Bandwidth τ z-stat Bandwidth τ z-stat Bandwidth
Male
0 0.177** 2.447 23.28 0.159*** 2.639 33.51 0.046 1.482 44.83 0.035 1.322 60.86
1 0.205** 2.149 48.14 0.217*** 2.845 76.23 0.149** 2.374 37.33 0.060 1.429 88.54
2 0.209** 1.962 83.50 0.213** 2.085 91.51 0.190** 2.518 56.81 0.102* 1.853 105.42
Female
0 0.09** 2.220 45.63 0.082*** 2.604 76.65 −0.004 −0.160 40.91 0.001 0.055 61.08
1 0.107* 1.825 80.29 0.110** 2.059 96.40 −0.014 −0.354 78.42 −0.011 −0.392 134.77
2 0.030 0.282 60.86 0.106 1.511 125.08 −0.083 −1.207 55.88 −0.028 −0.571 105.52
This table shows the RD estimates of test scores using different local-polynomial degrees (per row) and different bandwidth selection procedures (per column). The first panel on the left has the results for candidates whose parents
have no college degree and at least one has no high school education. The second panel on the right has the results for candidates whose either both parents have a high school diploma or at least one has a college degree. The CCT
procedure is proposed by Calonico et al. (2014). The IW procedure is proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). All functions are estimated using a triangular kernel. Data come from applications for undergraduate programs at
UFPE from 2002 to 2005. The sample is restricted to those who graduated from high school in the same year and were under 18.5 years old. τ is the robust RD estimate










Table 6 RD estimates of test scores by household income
<5 MWs 5–10 MWs >10 MWs
Polyn. CCT procedure IW procedure CCT procedure IW procedure CCT procedure IW procedure
degree τ z-stat τ z-stat τ z-stat τ z-stat τ z-stat τ z-stat
Male
0 0.220*** 2.808 0.040 1.188 0.075 1.430 0.074 1.626 0.033 0.668 0.025 0.717
1 0.257*** 2.826 0.216*** 2.877 0.067 0.870 0.096* 1.791 0.013 0.210 0.044 1.026
2 0.280*** 2.928 0.246*** 2.924 0.063 0.633 0.083 1.133 0.078 0.805 0.006 0.080
Female
0 0.094** 2.314 0.061** 2.568 0.050 1.222 0.055 1.517 −0.063 −1.356 −0.007 −0.285
1 0.108** 2.036 0.109** 2.277 −0.028 −0.370 0.067 1.328 −0.088 −1.458 −0.078 −1.558
2 0.100 1.197 0.123** 2.013 −0.057 −0.625 0.005 0.076 −0.119 −1.338 −0.103* −1.875
This table shows the RD estimates of test scores using different local-polynomial degrees (per row) and different bandwidth selection procedures (per column). The first panel on the left has the results for candidates from households
that receive less than five minimum wages (<5 MWs) per month. The second panel in the center has the results for candidates from households that receive between five and ten minimum wages (5–10 MWs) per month. The third
panel on the right has the results for candidates from households that receive more than ten minimum wages (>10 MWs) per month. The CCT procedure is proposed by Calonico et al. (2014). The IW procedure is proposed by Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012). All functions are estimated using a triangular kernel. Data come from applications for undergraduate programs at UFPE from 2002 to 2005. The sample is restricted to those who graduated from high school
in the same year and were under 18.5 years old. τ is the robust RD estimate










Table 7 RD estimates of test scores by school choice
Public high school Private high school
Polyn. CCT procedure IW procedure CCT procedure IW procedure
degree τ z-stat Bandwidth τ z-stat Bandwidth τ z-stat Bandwidth τ z-stat Bandwidth
Male
0 0.184** 2.225 24.65 0.090* 1.787 64.52 0.036 1.166 45.04 0.031 1.073 53.11
1 0.211** 2.185 64.14 0.181** 2.095 79.54 0.081 1.513 52.60 0.044 1.120 99.72
2 0.296** 2.091 65.62 0.230** 2.061 102.88 0.089 1.404 78.92 0.048 1.095 171.98
Female
0 0.082 1.477 32.86 0.076** 2.002 76.17 −0.029 −0.904 29.33 0.001 0.057 60.36
1 0.041 0.429 42.69 0.089* 1.697 144.49 −0.038 −0.977 72.78 −0.020 −0.630 107.40
2 0.001 0.005 59.70 0.149** 1.983 143.90 −0.136** −1.981 53.75 −0.043 −1.012 130.34
This table shows the RD estimates of test scores using different local-polynomial degrees (per row) and different bandwidth selection procedures (per column). The first panel on the left has the results for candidates who graduated
from a public high school. The second panel on the right has the results for candidates who graduated from a private high school. The CCT procedure is proposed by Calonico et al. (2014). The IW procedure is proposed by Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012). All functions are estimated using a triangular kernel. Data come from applications for undergraduate programs at UFPE from 2002 to 2005. The sample is restricted to those who graduated from high school in the
same year and were under 18.5 years old. τ is the robust RD estimate
** and * represent statistical significance at the 5 and 10 % levels, respectively
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Fig. 8 Probability of studying in a private school. This figure shows the relationships between birthday and
studying in a private institution in primary andmiddle school (top left), between birthday and graduating from
a private high school (top right), between birthday and having always studied in private institutions (bottom
right), and between birthday and moving from a public middle school to a private high school (bottom left).
The center of the graphs is zero, which represents January 1. Data come from applications for undergraduate
programs at UFPE from 2002 to 2005. The sample is restricted to those who graduated from high school in
the same year and were under 18.5 years old. Functions are estimated using a triangular kernel with the
bandwidth selection procedure proposed by Calonico et al. (2014). τ is the RD estimate, with robust standard
errors in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively
Table 7 tells that attending private school is responsible for 9 % of the average effect on
boys and 267 % on girls (not significant).16
4.5 The effect on early employment and earnings
Since our sample is from college candidates who have recently entered the labor mar-
ket, we cannot estimate the effect on lifetime earnings. Nonetheless, we can verify
whether these candidates have gains/losses related to their birth date in the early stages
of their career. Table 8 presents the estimated effect of birthday on employment, college
graduation, and earnings at the age of 25 for UFPE candidates from poor households.17
For male candidates, being born on or after January 1 has no significant effect on the
probability of graduating from college or being employed, but it increases earnings by
15–22 %. Namely, the difference in admission test scores found earlier does not imply










Table 8 RD estimates of employment and earnings at 25 years old
Less-educated parents
Less-educated parents HH income <5 MWs and HH income <10 MWs
CCT procedure IW procedure CCT procedure IW procedure CCT procedure IW procedure
τ z-stat τ z-stat τ z-stat τ z-stat τ z-stat τ z-stat
Male
Employed −0.024 −0.465 −0.025 −0.505 −0.012 −0.259 −0.017 −0.384 −0.010 −0.193 −0.013 −0.261
Employed and graduated 0.024 0.366 0.045 0.969 −0.020 −0.336 0.015 0.362 −0.002 −0.025 0.031 0.694
Log earnings 0.189* 1.949 0.162* 1.874 0.194* 1.873 0.150* 1.943 0.224** 2.222 0.210** 2.259
Female
Employed −0.054 −1.216 −0.044 −1.416 −0.042 −0.982 −0.015 −0.569 −0.055 −1.268 −0.045 −1.430
Employed and graduated 0.136** 2.172 0.077* 1.692 0.053 1.100 0.043 1.400 0.136** 2.159 0.094* 1.859
Log earnings 0.125 1.445 0.050 0.801 0.051 0.854 0.033 0.657 0.138 1.566 0.057 0.904
This table shows the RD estimates of employment outcomes at the age of 25 (per row) and different bandwidth selection procedures (per column). The outcomes are as follows: being employed, having graduated from college and
being employed, and log of earnings. The first panel on the left has the results for candidates whose parents have no college degree and at least one has no high school education. The second panel in the center has the results for
candidates from households that receive less than five minimum wages (<5 MWs). The third panel on the right has the results for candidates from households that receive less than ten minimum wages (<10 MWs) and where parents
have no college degree and at least one has no high school education. The CCT procedure is proposed by Calonico et al. (2014). The IW procedure is proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). All functions are estimated using a
triangular kernel. Data come from applications for undergraduate programs at UFPE from 2002 to 2005. The sample is restricted to those who graduated from high school in the same year and were under 18.5 years old. τ is the robust
RD estimate
** and * represent statistical significance at the 5 and 10 % levels, respectively
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counterparts born the previous December. However, the ability gap continues in the labor
market and is reflected in earnings.
For female candidates, the effect on earnings is not as strong and significant as it is for
men. Yet the probability of graduating from college and being employed by the age of 25
is 4–14 % higher if they were born on or after January 1. Unlike men, women who are
born in January do graduate sooner than women born in the previous December. This
means that the potential return for a college degree emerges earlier in their life cycle,
which probably increases their lifetime earnings.
5 Conclusions
Delaying primary school entry tends to affect students’ outcomes not merely in the
early grades. We reach this conclusion by exploiting an exogenous variation in birthdays
between late December and early January and the minimum-age rule enforced by pri-
mary schools in Brazil. In particular, we find that college applicants who were older than
their classmates in the first grade are more likely to be admitted to a flagship university
right after high school. On the one hand, the age difference created by the minimum-
age rule disappears over time because younger students are more likely to repeat grades.
Once they have to repeat a grade, they become one of the oldest in their class. On the
other hand, candidates born on January 1 still outperform those born on December 31,
even though they are the same age when they apply for college. Thus, it is not necessarily
the current maturity gap that affects their test scores but the difference in their learning
abilities at school.
The difference in aptitude test scores, as well as in the likelihood of college admission,
created by the minimum-age rule is much greater for boys than for girls. This indicates
that the maturity gap in primary school, which affects long-run outcomes, tends to close
faster for girls, who usually mature earlier than boys. Moreover, this rule affects mainly
college candidates whose parents are poorer and less educated. In this group, delaying
primary school for a year increases by 0.73–0.86 sds the college admission test score
of boys and by 0.14–0.57 sds the score of girls. As long as human capital accumulation
before primary school is related to parents’ education and wealth, this finding suggests
that differences in aptitude test scores are mostly created at primary school.
We also observe that students born in January tend to move from public to private
schools some time after their advantage with respect to their classmates is revealed.
Although Brazil has no tracking system, this sorting mechanism may be a reason why the
effect of age at school entry persists among poor students. The persistence of this effect is
reflected not only in the test scores but also in the early gains in the labor market. These
gains happen either directly through earnings (for men) or indirectly by graduating and
entering the market sooner (for women).
Our findings reinforce the need for change in the inflexible age-grade system that puts
children with disparate learning abilities in the same class. Since children are assessed
at times dictated by a fixed school calendar, younger pupils have a natural disadvantage
that may continue to their adulthood. Although grade retention tends to adjust the age
difference in the early grades, this is not an effective way of narrowing the learning
gap (e.g., Manacorda 2012). To assess students’ actual ability, the school system should
apply age-normalized exams, which ensure that they are compared to peers at exactly the
same age.
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One important caveat in interpreting the results of our study is their external valid-
ity. In fact, we cannot claim that our findings result from the long-term effects of age
at school entry on the entire population of first graders. Given our setting and the
available data, we have instead focused on their interval validity by selecting a very
specific sample. Namely, our inferences are for a population of high school graduates
with little age-grade distortion, aiming to join an elite institution. In that sense, our
study differs, for instance, from Crawford et al. (2010), who estimates the likelihood
of a first grader going to college, despite the quality of the institution. However, we
still believe that our study contributes to the debate about school-entry age by show-
ing estimated effects on students who are probably at the top of the distribution of
skills.
Endnotes
1Effects on labor market outcomes in the USA are in part explained by the compulsory
laws that specify a minimum school leaving age.
2See Brewer et al. (1999) and Dale and Krueger (2002) on the returns of attending an
elite institution.
3According to PREAL (2009), almost 25 % of first-grade students repeat the year and
more than 40 % of high school students have fallen two or more years behind.
4This difference between genders is in line with McEwan and Shapiro (2008), who find
that the effect of delaying school entry on test scores at the fourth grade is one third
higher for boys than for girls.
5According to the Ministry of Education, UFPE is the largest and most selective univer-
sity in the North and Northeast regions of Brazil. It has 62 undergraduate programs and
108 graduate programs. In 2004, the university had 25,000 enrolled students (20,500 in
undergraduate programs and 4500 in graduate programs) and 1647 faculty members.
6Since 2010, the admission score has been composed of the vestibular and the National
High School Exam (similar to the American SAT test).
7In Brazil, universities require candidates to choose their major when they apply for an
undergraduate program.
8A law approved in 2012 requires that all federal universities implement quotas by
2016 on the basis of attendance at a public high school, family income, or qualifying as
indigenous or an afrodescendant.
9This law changed in 2010. The new law added one more grade to primary education
and now requires children to turn six by March 31 in the year of the first grade.
10We have two additional remarks regarding our sample. The first relates to the pos-
sibility of students being grade advanced. The implication for our estimates would be
severe, because the selection bias would be negative instead of positive. In Brazil, how-
ever, the percentage of pupils skipping at least one grade has been close to zero. According
to the National Institute for Educational Studies and Research (INEP), this number was
682 (around 31 students in the state of Pernambuco) in 2000. This situation started to
change in 2005, when the Government launched a program to identify gifted students. In
2010, for example, the number of kids that skipped a grade in the country reached 8851,
which still represents a small percentage. Nevertheless, acceleration should not affect our
results given our sample period. The second remark is with regard to excluding those
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taking the exam for at least the second time. These candidates are either high school
graduates not accepted in the previous years, adults seeking professional training, or col-
lege students aiming to switch majors and/or institutions. We consider that this pool
of candidates is very heterogeneous and it is not necessarily comparable to high school
graduates.
11We also estimate the difference in terms of high school education and find a similar
magnitude. This result is available upon request.
12Differently from the USA, the numbers of kids moving a grade ahead in Brazil has
been historically close to zero. According to the National Institute for Educational Studies
and Research (INEP), the number of kids that moved ahead a grade in Brazil in 2000
was 682 (around 31 students in the State of Pernambuco). This situation however started
to change after 2005, when the Government launched a program to train professors in
identifying gifted students. In 2010, for example, the number of kids that moved ahead a
grade in the country reached 8,851, still small but 62 % larger than that observed in 2009
(5478 students).
13The estimated effect on first-grade enrollment by parents’ education is available upon
request.
14Sampaio et al. (2011), using similar data, show that wealthier parents are more
likely to pay for private tutoring classes for children graduating from high school in the
state of Pernambuco. They also provide evidence that tutoring classes increase scores
significantly.
15We report differences in RD estimates presented in Tables 5 and 6 in the Appendix
(see, respectively, Appendix: Tables 9 and 10).
16The effect through private school by gender is obtained by {average effect − [p *
(effect on public students) + (1−p) * (effect on private students)]}/(average effect), where
p is the proportion of candidates attending public schools.
17For wealthier candidates, no effect is significant.
Appendix
Table 9 Differences in RD estimates of test scores by parental education
Less-educated vs. well-educated parents
Polyn. CCT procedure IW procedure
degree Diff. z-stat Diff. z-stat
Male
0 0.131* 1.664 0.124* 1.884
1 0.056 0.490 0.157* 1.803
2 0.019 0.146 0.111 0.957
Female
0 0.094** 1.974 0.081** 2.228
1 0.121* 1.711 0.121** 2.005
2 0.113 0.892 0.134 1.566
This table shows the differences in RD estimates of test scores between well-educated parents and less-educated parents using
different local-polynomial degrees (per row) and different bandwidth selection procedures (per column). The CCT procedure is
proposed by Calonico et al. (2014). The IW procedure is proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). All functions are estimated
using a triangular kernel. Data come from applications for undergraduate programs at UFPE from 2002 to 2005. The sample is
restricted to those who graduated from high school in the same year and were under 18.5 years old










Table 10 Differences in RD estimates of test scores by household income
(<5 MWs)–(5–10 MWs) (5–10 MWs)–(>10 MWs) (<5 MWs)–(>10 MWs)
Polyn. CCT procedure IW procedure CCT procedure IW procedure CCT procedure IW procedure
degree Diff. z-stat Diff. z-stat Diff. z-stat Diff. z-stat Diff. z-stat Diff. z-stat
Male
0 0.145 1.538 −0.034 −0.601 0.042 0.583 0.049 0.855 0.187** 2.019 0.015 0.309
1 0.190 1.594 0.120 1.301 0.054 0.547 0.052 0.758 0.244** 2.218 0.172** 1.989
2 0.217 1.572 0.163 1.461 −0.015 −0.108 0.077 0.734 0.202 1.484 0.240** 2.129
Female
0 0.044 0.763 0.006 0.138 0.113* 1.825 0.062 1.416 0.157** 2.544 0.068** 1.990
1 0.136 1.472 0.042 0.604 0.060 0.620 0.145** 2.040 0.196** 2.439 0.187*** 2.700
2 0.157 1.269 0.118 1.314 0.062 0.487 0.108 1.260 0.219* 1.795 0.226*** 2.751
This table shows the differences in RD estimates of test scores between household income ranges using different local-polynomial degrees (per row) and different bandwidth selection procedures (per column). The first panel on the
left shows differences in estimates between candidates from households that receive less than five minimum wages (<5 MWs) per month and candidates from households that receive between five and ten minimum wages (5–10
MWs) per month. The second panel in the center shows differences in estimates between candidates from households that receive between five and ten minimum wages (5–10 MWs) per month and candidates from households that
receive more than ten minimum wages (>10 MWs) per month. The third panel on the right shows differences in estimates between candidates from households that receive less than five minimum wages (<5 MWs) per month and
candidates from households that receive more than ten minimum wages (>10 MWs) per month. The CCT procedure is proposed by Calonico et al. (2014). The IW procedure is proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). All
functions are estimated using a triangular kernel. Data come from applications for undergraduate programs at UFPE from 2002 to 2005. The sample is restricted to those who graduated from high school in the same year and were
under 18.5 years old
***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively
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